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Introduction to Joint Venturing
in Japan*
Francis T. Vaughan
I. WHY A JOINT VENTURE?
T WOULD SEEM natural that a foreign company wishing to
establish operations in Japan would want to use a wholly-owned
subsidiary in preference to any other vehicle of operations, provided
that the scale of its operations here were sizeable. However, many
foreign businessmen find that
they are engaging in wishful
THE AUTHOR: FRANcIS T. VAUGHAN thinking in their desire to use a
(B.S., M.B.A., Sophia University, Tokyo,
Japan) is the Sales Training and Devel- wholly-owned subsidiary.
opment Manager - Japan at Avon Al- Time and again responsible
lied Products, Inc., a major multinational officials of the Japanese govern-
cosmetics company, in Tokyo, Japan. mentciast the ee n-ment have stated that equity in-
vestment by foreign capital
should be limited to 50%/0 or less. Despite four rounds of capital
liberalization, the last of which took place in August, 1971, and
concomitant press releases which stated that investment of foreign
capital in Japan is now 93o liberalized, the restrictive policy of the
government concerning foreign investment still stands.
Indeed, it can safely be stated that liberalization, in the Japanese
understanding of the word, means something different from the
meaning commonly attributed to it by English-speaking people. As
with many other things in Japan, the word has a peculiarly Japanese
connotation. For example, in order to qualify as an investment in
a liberalized field, the investment has to be in a newly established
enterprise; and a newly established enterprise is unable to expand
its activity beyond the particular industry in which it is initially per-
mitted to operate, unless the approval of the proper minister is ob-
tained. Another condition is that the proposed investment must not
have an exceptionally detrimental effect on the interests of Japan.
Liberalization? Yes, but in a very restricted manner. Perhaps it
was a situation like this Mr. Stone was thinking of when he said you
* This article has also been published, in substantially the same form, as Bulletin
No. 30 of the Sophia University Socio-Economic Institute, Tokyo, Japan.
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could add a negative to most Japanese sentences without really
changing the meaning.'
Although there are no accurate up-to-date figures to check what
it all means in reality, there are statistics which show the general
trends in recent years of foreign capital investment in Japan. The
Japan Times, in a special supplement on liberalization (August 12,
1971), stated that the fact that there have only been 28 cases of
investment in this nation by foreigners authorized as "automatically
approved" since the first round of the capital liberalization program
in 1967 is eloquent testimony to the fact that the liberalization
measures adopted by Japan over the years have been hardly attrac-
tive to foreign investors.
According to a government survey of foreign capital affiliated en-
terprises, there were 729 such enterprises in Japan as of June 30,
1969.2 From the 653 enterprises which completed a government
questionnaire we note some interesting trends. Among these 653
enterprises, some 81 of them were considered as newly established,
and it is by comparing these with the total that certain trends can be
deduced.
Of the total 653 some 30%o were more than 95/c foreign-capi-
talized, whereas among the 81 newly-established enterprises only
197o fall into that category. If we take 50/50 equity holding by
foreign and Japanese parties we find that of the total only 26%lo fall
into that category, whereas among the newer enterprises that cate-
gory accounts for 50%. For a third method of comparison we find
that of the total around 60o were joint ventures, while some 80o
of the newer enterprises were joint ventures.
In the early 1960's and prior thereto it was possible (and rela-
tively easy) for foreign enterprises to set up wholly-owned subsid-
iaries in Japan using yen funds (so-called "Yen base companies").
However, after 1963 this method of entering Japan was abolished,
and anyone desiring to enter had to obtain Japanese government
validation, an achievement not easily obtained. Furthermore, the
extent to which foreign capital could participate in particular indus-
tries was severely limited. This trend has continued until today, as
is evidenced by the small number of liberalized industries allowing
100%c foreign capital investment (228 in all, out of a total of 850
1 P. STONE, JAPAN SURGES AHEAD: THE STORY OF AN ECONOMIC MIRACLE 11
(1969).
2 BUSINESS INTERCOMMUNICATIONS, INC., FOREIGN CAPITAL AFFILIATED ENTER-
PRISES IN JAPAN 6-8 (1970).
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liberalized industries, and many of the 100% liberalized fields are
not very attractive to foreign investors). In general, it can be said
that the Japanese Government prefers an investment of 50% or less
by the foreign party.
Once the foreign investor has grasped the full significance of the
situation outlined above, if he allows himself to do so, the Japanese
environment will become a little less frustrating. He can refer to
it as government interference in private enterprise, as anti-foreign,
or whatever he wishes, but if he realizes early that the Japanese
government will be much happier if he engages in a JV with a Japa-
nese partner then he can enter the Japanese market with a certain
feeling of being welcome, or at least of not being totally undesir-
able. He will, of course, have to cope with a certain amount of
government interference and "administrative guidance" later on.
II. CHOOSING A PARTNER
The foreign investor's first problem of initiation to the world of
Japanese business having been successfully overcome, he can now
concentrate on the more concrete task of choosing a partner. De-
pending on the particular field of industry in which he is engaged
he will have a number of prospective partners available. Of course,
these partners will be much more interested in his technology than
they will be in his equity participation, but he can use that technol-
ogy to achieve his ends, and this is the course foreign businessmen
are following today. In the past they were happy to license their
technology to the Japanese, but they found that by doing so they
were not always getting full value for it. The government desired
that the royalties not exceed five percent. Furthermore, the Japa-
nese companies used the technology to improve their products and
then exported those improved products into the home markets of
the foreign licensors. American businessmen, in particular, have
realized this, their trade with Japan having changed from a healthy
balance in favor of the United States to a several billion dollar sur-
plus in favor of Japan. Nowadays, the policy of most United States
businessmen is equity participation or no technology, and Japanese
businessmen are gradually getting the message.
In choosing a partner the foreign investor will benefit from any
reading he has done about the pre-World War II makeup of the
Japanese industrial world. Prewar Japan was dominated by the
zaibatsu, and while these were officially broken up by the American
military occupation after the war the ties that bound them together
[Vol. 6: 178
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were never really broken. This is demonstrated by the fact that
The Oriental Economist thought the present regrouping of these in-
dustries worthy of a series of articles throughout 1970.
In his book on business and politics in Japan, Chitoshi Yanaga
deals at length with the various regroupings of the former zaibatsu
or keiretsu as they are referred to now.' While they lack the tight
organization of the pre-war zaibatsu, the keiretsu of today are a
power to be reckoned with. These groups consist of two kinds:
those organized around the former zaibatsu and using the old names
(Mitsubishi-28; Mitsui-22; Sumitomo-15) and those held together
by large banks (Fuji, formerly Yasuda; Dai-ichi; the Industrial
Bank of Japan). While the figures quoted above give an idea of
the size of these groupings the reality is far more extensive, with
each member of each group probably having as many as one hun-
dred, or even several hundred, subcontractors working on its behalf.
In addition to the keiretsu there are many other industrial or in-
dustry-related groupings of influential executives in present-day Ja-
pan. To give an extreme case of the Japanese desire to group, there
is the Tuesday Club (one of many under this title) composed of
approximately six hundred former officials of the Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry (MITI) and its predecessor, the Min-
istry of Commerce and Industry, who are now employed as senior
executives of large corporations.
To know the details of the various groupings, if that is possible,
is to have the key to doing business in Japan. In choosing the rela-
tive merits of the various prospective partners, a foreign investor
will do well to check the prominence of each in its respective group,
if it belongs to a group. He will also do well to check each prospec-
tive partner's channels of contact with government and banking in-
stitutions. Looking at each of these aspects will give the prospec-
tive joint venturer a completely different picture and, in the long
run, will probably make his choice much easier and a much less
hazardous task. Connections with government, banking, and big
business are essentials in the carrying on of business in Japan; if
these contacts are solid, there is little likelihood that the prospective
business venture will turn out to be a failure. Membership in the
group does not automatically guarantee success, but it creates a feel-
ing of stability which will pervade the new enterprise and may mean
the difference between survival and demise.
3 C. YANAGA, BIG BUSINESS IN JAPANESE POLITICS ch. 2, 3 (1968); INDUSTIAL
GROUPINGS IN JAPAN (Dodwell Consultants ed. 1974).
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Some authors advocate choosing a partner seeking to diversify
its business operations. 4 It is felt that such a partner will have
greater growth potential and will be much more compliant because
of its lack of experience in the new field and its need for new
technology. However, in its list of conditions for automatic valida-
tion, the government has stated that the Japanese partner to a JV
should be already established in the particular field of industry. To
choose such a partner, unless it had strong group support, would, I
think, often add more difficulties to those already existing.
III. NEGOTIATING WITH THE NEW PARTNER
Having set his sights on a particular partner, it now remains for
the foreign businessman to approach that partner and work out a vi-
able mode of operations with him. Very often, of course, the pro-
cedure will be the reverse, with the Japanese party first approaching
the foreign party since, in general, the Japanese, through the good
offices of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), often
seem to be much better informed about foreign technological break-
throughs and business in general than foreigners are about the Japa-
nese scene. Whichever way the approach is made, it will prove
beneficial to the foreigner to observe a number of rules of etiquette
in negotiating in Japan.
First among those rules of etiquette is "hasten slowly." Foreign-
ers usually come to Japan with a very fixed schedule and very defi-
nite targets for achievement, all very good in the framework of West-
ern management concepts but not always workable in Japan. One
recent case I had reason to learn of was that of a foreign firm which
had already been approached by a Japanese firm in the United
States. Certain preliminary understandings had been reached and
it was decided to hold further discussions in Japan toward setting
up a JV. The foreign firm drew up the schedule for final discus-
sions and generously allowed one week of time for negotiating,
drawing up, and signing the final contract. The reply of the lawyer
whom they contacted in Japan about providing local counsel was
that the Pacific is a very large place where one could wander around
for a long time without reaching port. In other words, he was try-
ing to tell them that their schedule was unrealistic in the Japanese
context. The final negotiations for that particular JV lasted for
more than a year.
While the above case may be a little bit extreme, similar cases are
4 BuSINESS STRATEGIES FOR JAPAN 108 (J. Abegglen ed. 1970).
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not unheard of. Things do happen in Japan, and, if we are to judge
by the post-war growth rate of the Japanese GNP, now just over
$200 billion, things would seem to be happening very fast. How-
ever, it takes a long time to get a project off the ground, and much
negotiation, patience, waiting, and more negotiation are necessary.
No one in Japan seems to be able to make a decision on his own:
he has to consult his colleagues, the trade associations, or perhaps
the government, and he has to tell each one what the others said to
him. Only after all that procedure has been gone through will a de-
cision be reached. The foreign partner would do well to bear this
in mind; otherwise he will be antagonizing his prospective Japanese
partner, increasing his own blood pressure, and, finally, creating
problems for the future JV if it ever comes into being.
The second rule of etiquette is the importance of getting to
know one another, and, hence, the creation of mutual trust. In
the West we tend to operate by the word of the contract irrespec-
tive of what we think of the other person. In Japan things are dif-
ferent: people work together on the basis of mutual trust and un-
derstanding and rarely use contracts. As a matter of fact, it is said
that, after signing a contract, a Japanese puts it in the bottom drawer
and never looks at it again. Contracts are simply not important.'
To overlook this aspect of Japanese thinking will prove to be a big
mistake on the part of the Western businessman.
How to create mutual trust is another question. By observing the
first rule of etiquette stated above one will have laid the ground-
work for such trust. Japanese when they first meet like to talk about
the weather and all sorts of trifles, not for the sake of killing time,
but to break the ice for future discussions. A foreigner who sched-
ules a conference for 9 A.M. on a Monday morning and at 9:01
launches right into the heart of the matter is likely to get a lot of
blank stares from his Japanese partner, and what he says is unlikely
to leave a deep imprint on his mind. After entering the confer-
ence room, it would be much more beneficial to spend five or ten
minutes greeting each person of the opposite party and then have
coffee and talk about trivia for the first hour or so. After that, sub-
stantive and fruitful discussion could take place in an atmosphere of
incipient trust and openness.
In general, the foreigner should be open and frank with his
Japanese partner. He should not be despotic in laying down certain
5 N. CHIE, JAPANESE SOCIETY ch. 2 (1970); see also J. SAWADA, SUBSEQUENT
CONDUCT AND SUPERVENING EVENTS 162 (1968); D. HENDERSON, CONCILIATION
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conditions; he will achieve just as much by putting the matter clearly
and reasonably, even if firmly, before the Japanese partner and seek-
ing his cooperation in implementing his wishes. More often than
not, the Japanese will conform if he realizes that the foreigner is
well-intentioned and that he is seeking mutual understanding and
cooperation for the benefit of both parties and not simply for his own
selfish profit.
If the various contracts for the joint venture are gone through
by both parties and thoroughly discussed and agreed upon, not out
of forced necessity but because both parties agree that this is the
best thing to do, then a spirit of trust will have been created and a
storefull of goodwill will have been created by the foreign party
which can be drawn upon time and again in the future. If, in their
discussions, this is not achieved, then it would be almost better never
to have initiated the JV, because, as is natural, problems are bound
to arise in the future, and, if there is misunderstanding and dis-
trust in the beginning, there is likely to be even greater misunder-
standing and distrust as time goes by. The spirit of mutual trust
and confidence is a sine qua non to the JV. If it is there, no prob-
lem is insoluble; if it is absent, almost no problem is soluble.
A third rule of etiquette for the foreign joint venturer is to al-
low the Japanese party to handle all negotiations with the govern-
ment. Negotiations with the government? What does that have
to do with a private contract? Let's just say that in Japan govern-
ment and business are closely allied. One seldom does anything
without informing the other. This is especially true in the case of
foreign capital investment or international contracts of any nature.
MITI, in particular, wishes to protect the interests of a "not yet
fully developed" Japanese industry from the invasion of foreign
"imperialistic" capital. It is a cardinal rule for all Japanese enter-
prises that they inform MITI of their intentions when they wish to
tie-up with a foreign investor.
MITI will want to know all about the foreign partner and will
want to oversee the formation of the contract. For this reason it
may be necessary to consult with MITI several times during the
negotiations, and the person to do this is the Japanese partner rather
than the foreign partner. Few foreigners can fully understand and
tolerate the attitude and guidelines of MITI, which are not written
in any law but-which nevertheless must be observed. To bring a
AND JAPANESE LAw (1971); ASIAN CONTRAcT LAW: A SURVEY OF CURRENT PROB-
LEMS (G. Allen ed. 1969).
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foreigner to MITI can often do more damage than good. The
foreigner will probably blow his top at what he thinks is unneces-
sary government interference and may even refuse to comply with
MITI's administrative guidance. MITI will not necessarily force
him to comply, but if he doesn't it may not accept the contract even
for "automatic approval" if the field of industry is liberalized, much
less grant a validation if such is required. If the foreign party has
achieved an understanding with his Japanese partner, he need have
little to fear from letting him go to MITI alone, provided he is kept
abreast of happenings and that no final decisions or commitments
are made without his approval. It is often the case that MITI will
require a nensho, or memorandum, from the Japanese partner, agree-
ing to certain conditions. Such memorandums should never be
written without the knowledge of both parties.
As far as its relations with the government and, in particular,
with MITI are concerned, the foreign company should be aware of a
few cardinal rules which it must observe in its negotiations with
the Japanese partner:
1. The foreign company will not be allowed to have a great-
er percentage of directors than its equity warrants; in other
words, it will not be allowed to control the board of directors
if it has only a 50%lo equity interest.
2. If it is in a minority equity position it will not be allowed
to incorporate any rules which will give it a right of veto.6
3. In licensing its technology to the joint venture, it 'will
not be allowed to include a clause limiting the area to which
goods may be exported except in very limited cases. It will not
be allowed to demand ownership of new technology; it will not
be allowed to demand grantback licenses where it does not
contract to grant licenses of new developments on its side. 7
As a general rule, the government will demand reciprocity and
equality in all matters relating to the JV, and possibly a bit more.
For a foreigner to think that because of outstanding technology or
strong financial position he will be allowed to dominate the new
company and also to obtain other privileges is wishful thinking as
far as Japan is concerned, and to try to do so only causes unnecessary
bad feelings and perhaps distrust.
Many foreigners try to make under-the-table agreements with
6 Ministry of Finance Announcement, June 30, 1967.
7 K. Iju, Review of International Contracts Executed in 1969, KAIGAI SHOJI
HOMU, July, 1970, at 7 ff.
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their Japanese partner which they do not report to MITI. Unless
the Japanese party to the JV is very willing to enter such agreements,
they really have no meaning and it is very doubtful if they would
be upheld in a court. If the Japanese party ever reneges on such
agreements, there is little the foreigner can do except get into a lot
of.trouble with the government by disclosing what happened be-
cause it should have been reported in the first place.
IV. STAFFING AND MANAGING THE JV
A difficult problem for the foreigner will be how to staff the
JV. The Japanese partner will seldom have problems in this area
and will probably propose to take care of all staffing problems him-
self. In this way he doesn't have to deal with the foreign party
at all except to send him reports from time to time on how matters
are developing. A number of such joint ventures were formed in
the 1950's8 and are commonly known as "licensing joint ventures."
They suited the Japanese thinking of how things should be done
very well since the new JV usually ended up as a department of
the parent company. However, they rarely paid handsome divi-
dends to the foreign party. This kind of JV is no longer popular for
obvious reasons.
A second and, to my way of thinking, an equally, if not more,
undesirable type of JV is one based on the shukko system. Under
this type of arrangement, personnel from the Japanese parent come
to the JV on transfer for two or three years and then return to the
parent company. If foreign personnel are in the JV the same is
probably true. The net result of this is that the JV never will have
personnel of its own, except perhaps the president, and for all prac-
tical purposes will not really exist as a viable entity.
To understand the above statements it is necessary to digress
a little bit to deal with the attitude of Japanese employees toward
their company. Most employees in Japan join the company after
leaving school, whether it be middle school, high school, or college.
After that their lives are bound up with the company, and, in their
thinking, the company is number one, and then perhaps come their
wives, families, etc. They belong to the company, look on it with
pride, and are assured that under the prevailing seniority (nenko)
system they will gradually climb the ladder of success and that the
company will take care of them and their families. If they are not
8 BUSINESS STRATEGIES FOR JAPAN, supra note 4, at 104.
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very productive, they may fall off the ladder a little and be trans-
ferred to a satellite company, where they will again move up, al-
though no longer in the mainstream. Any separation from the head
office (honkan) is looked upon with disfavor, even an assignment
overseas, which, from any Western way of thinking, would seem to
enhance their chances of promotion. The result, therefore, is the un-
easy feeling of the Japanese employee when he is transferred to a
JV in which a foreign party is involved. To some it is like being
sent to Siberia; they mourn their ill luck and can never really give
of their best to the JV. Often they will be disgruntled, and the gen-
eral morale of the JV may be very low.
For the reasons stated above, I think that great attention should
be paid to the staffing of the JV. In the beginning, it will probably
be necessary to have considerable help from the Japanese parent in
finding suitable staff; it may even be necessary to employ the shukko
system on a limited basis. However, as time goes on, it should be
possible for the JV to employ its own staff, and interference of the
parent in this field should be terminated as soon as possible. Hiring
a permanent staff for the JV should not be the role of the Japanese
parent; it should be the function of the management of the JV it-
self. By doing so, the management of the JV will choose people
with whom they themselves can work, and they will gradually be
able to build up a spirit of loyalty to the company and good morale.
Any foreign company intending to stay in Japan over a consid-
erable period of time should make sure that its thinking on this is
clearly understood from the beginning and that the Japanese partner
will cooperate in carrying it out. Failure to do so will have a serious
effect on the JV itself; it will probably lead to a certain amount of
friction among the Japanese and foreign parents, and in the long
run will probably result in diminished returns for both. The im-
portance of loyal and harmoniously-working personnel to a Japa-
nese company can hardly be overestimated. Suffice it to say that
lacking such a situation no company can survive very long in Japan.
Depending on the nature of the products to be handled by the
JV, it will be relatively easy or difficult to put together a group of
men to manage the company. The president of the company will
usually be Japanese, since this is one of the positions that the Japa-
nese strongly push for, and probably justifiably so, since the com-
pany is to be a Japanese company. The directors will be split ac-
cording to the equity holding ratio of the partners to the JV, with
the position of representative director or general manager going to
19741
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the foreign party. Holding one of these positions gives the foreign
party a considerable amount of control over the running of the com-
pany as the day-to-day operating of the company will usually be
the task of the representative director or the general manager inso-
far as any one person holds sway in decisions to be made. Very
often in Japanese companies the position of president carries very
little extra authority, since a great deal of his job is usually to put
his seal on decisions already reached at middle and top manage-
ment levels.
A fact which may surprise the foreign partner is the number of
directors the Japanese partner will suggest. Among leading indus-
tries in Japan, the average size of the board is 14.4 members,9 much
higher than the corresponding figure in the West. The foreign part-
ner may think this is ridiculous and object. However, if he is in-
telligent and does his homework, he will find that many of the po-
sitions on the board of directors are merely honorary positions with
little salary, and, hence, there is no need to worry unduly about a
few extra heads. The foreign partner's only problem will be to se-
lect an equal number of directors from his side to compete with the
Japanese; he may be forced to pack the board with lawyers, ac-
countants, and other professionals based in Japan, instead of send-
ing people over for every meeting to ensure that his voting power
will be upheld.
A position to which the foreign partner should pay great at-
tention is that of auditor. The position of auditor in a Japanese
company is usually only nominal, often being filled by a non-profes-
sional with little financial background, and bears little weight in
day-to-day running of the company. However, in view of the fact
that Japanese accounting practices are notorious for their lack of
uniformity and expertise, the foreign partner will be well advised to
see to it that this position is upgraded and that standard methods of
accounting are used in addition to monthly progress reports and
cash flow statements.
Insisting on competent auditors is also a means of ensuring for
the foreigner his rightful share of dividends and royalties, which a
number of joint ventures have failed to obtain, not always because
of blatant fraud, but more often because of outdated and incompe-
tent accounting methods.
) T. ADAMS & N. KOBAYASHI, THE WORLD OF JAPANESE BuSINEss 281 (1968);
see also R. Ballon, Top Executives and Company Presidents in Japan (Sophia Uni-
versity Socio-Economic Institute Bulletins No. 27, 28).
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Having taken care of the directors and auditors, the next most
important thing will be to find men for heads of the various de-
partments and sections. It may be necessary to draw on outside
sources for some of these men, as the Japanese parent may not be
able or willing to provide them on a long-term basis, especially if the
JV is expected to grow to a considerable size.
In choosing these men, it will be necessary to proceed with ut-
most care, because they will be the important decision makers in the
company. Drawing from outside sources in itself presents problems
because, depending on the number of different companies from
which they are taken, the varying management philosophies will
be increased. Each Japanese company has something unique in its
management p44iosophy, and bringing together a number of men
from different companies and moulding them into a homogeneous
group 'can present enormous difficulties. It will take a wise presi-
dent and representative director or general manager to combine the
talents of these men, form them into a decision-making group on
the basis of the Japanese ringisho system, and ensure that personal
jealousies, prejudices, etc. will not interfere with the success of the
JV. Sometimes it is said that such a task is impossible and that
the joint venture will never have a good middle and upper manage-
ment staff until the second generation of managers takes over, i.e.,
the men who joined the company straight from school and ma-
tured into management talent. However, the JV can't wait that
long, so, in order to operate in the beginning, particular emphasis
should be placed on the homogeneity of middle and top manage-
ment so that they, by forming a cohesive group, may be able to cre-
ate the morale and leadership necessary to guide and form the rank
and file workers.
Special attention should also be placed on the selection of for-
eign personnel for the JV. Although it is not likely to occur, for-
eign personnel should, as much as possible, be kept out of line man-
agement and be confined to staff or advisory positions. The reason
for this is that it is difficult to understand the Japanese ringisho
method of decision-making, whereby decisions are formulated at
middle or lower management level, and, through a series of discus-
sions and placing of seals, these decisions find their way up the lad-
der right to the top where they are given the final go ahead and im-
plemented. A foreigner directly involved in this process of decision-
making may cause unnecessary disharmony. If, on the other hand,
he is involved in a staff or advisory position, he can communicate
1974]
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his thinking privately to an individual or individuals on the decision-
making ladder who are in a position to influence the final outcome.
A foreigner with weight of years and experience is probably
more suited for this kind of position than one who is young, be-
cause years and experience count much with the Japanese elders of
the joint venture. Relations between foreigners and Japanese in
a JV will always cause a certain amount of friction, but choice of
proper men, properly initiated, will help to avoid many of the in-
herent problems and, in the long run, may contribute much to the
success of the venture.
V. SOLVING OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
Having gotten management and personnel together, the prob-
lem now remains of how to run the JV. The uninitiated foreigner
may find that many of the things taken for granted in Western busi-
ness practices are quite different in Japan. These problems may
not arise too seriously in the JV because of the participation of Jap-
anese on an equal footing with the foreigner, but most of them are
bound to come up for heated discussion at one time or another.
Among these problems are likely to be the following: market share
v. profit; to owe v. to own; and living with the Japanese distribution
system.
Market Share v. Profit
In the world of Japanese business, market share is regarded as
the measure of success. For this almost everything else will be sacri-
ficed, including the financial stability of the company. To be able
to hold or increase one's market share is a sign of the prosperity of
the company and enables the company to keep its status among its
competitors. To loose one's market share, on the other hand, is an
ill omen which may cause the resignation of many top personnel.
In the West, and particularly in the United States, while mar-
ket share is important, there is another more important fact r, the
profitability of the company. Western companies plan to increase
their market share, but they seldom succeed, except perhaps in the
very early stages of market penetration. One of the main reasons
for the Westerners' insistence on profit is their consciousness of the
reaction of their shareholders.
Trying to find a happy medium between these two quite differ-
ent philosophies will not be easy. To the Japanese, doing business
[Vol. 6: 178
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solely for the sake of profit has a bad connotation, whereas, to the
Westerner, not to do so is stupidity. Both have their good points
and also their bad points. The Japanese can point to the failure
of Western goods to penetrate overseas markets as a failure of the
profit-approach system, which results in their goods being over-
priced. The foreigner can point to the numerous bankruptcies
among Japanese companies, placing emphasis on the famous Ya-
maichi failure in 1964, as being the result of poor internal financ-
ing, which, in turn, resulted from profit levels which did not al-
low the building up of substantial retained earnings. The joint
venture may have to follow a compromise approach that allows for
slightly lower market penetration than the Japanese would have
liked, and slightly lower profits than the foreigner would have
wished for. In general, foreign affiliated enterprises tend to be more
profitable than other Japanese enterprises,1° which probably means
that the foreign partner usually succeeds in convincing his Japa-
nese partner of the need for profit, although maybe not quite as
much as he would like.
To Owe v. To Own
Closely allied to the problem of market share and profits is the
problem of corporate financing. If the Japanese partner is given
free rein in running the JV, he will probably, before too long, bring
it on to a par financially with the average Japanese company, which
has a debt/equity ratio of about 6:1; in some cases the debt/equity
ratio runs as high as 11:1, as was the case with Idemitsu in 1966.11
In the United States, on the other hand, the debt/equity ratio of
the average company would be about 2:3; should it fall below 1:1
the particular company would be considered a poor financial risk
and would have great difficulty obtaining loans from financial in-
stitutions, unless it were considered a vital industry.
The foreign party will find it hard to agree with his Japanese
partner on the financial management of the company, because to
him, with his Keynesian background, the general financial policies
of Japanese companies are heresy. However, he may soon come to
realize that the Japanese method of financing is not as bad as it
seemed at first sight. If he pursues the matter, he will find that,
while about ten thousand Japanese companies go bankrupt every
year, very few of these are large companies. As a matter of fact,
10 FOREIGN ENTERPRISES, supra note 2, at 29.
11 BuSINESS STRATEGIES FOR JAPAN, supra note 4, at 58.
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80% of all bankrupticies occur in enterprises with less than five
million yen (U.S. $17,000) in capital. 12 If he studies further, he
will find out that within the particular company groupings mentioned
earlier there is much mutual cooperation and the members will sel-
dom allow an individual company to go bankrupt, mainly because of
the interwoven stockholding relationship that exists in the groupings.
He will also find that banks in Japan are much more liberal with
loans than those in the United States or Europe, and that banks and
business in Japan, although not as closely joined together as they were
much mutual cooperation and the members will seldom allow an
individual company to go bankrupt, mainly because of the inter-
woven stockholding relationship that exists in the groupings. He
will also find that banks in Japan are much more liberal with loans
than those in the United States or Europe, and that banks and busi-
ness in Japan, although not as closely joined together as they were
in pre-World War II days, still have many common interests. When
a bank makes a sizable loan to a Japanese company, it often insists
on placing one of its employees on the board of that company, or
at least in a responsible managerial position. In this manner the
bank can carefully watch what the company is doing, and the com-
pany is unlikely to object, first, because it needs the loan and, sec-
ondly, because it is receiving free financial advice; this may not be
popular in their outdated accounting department, but it will prob-
ably be of immense value to the company in the long run. If the
foreigner delves even further and touches upon the economics of
the situation, he may come to agree with Abbeglen that borrowing
is a cheaper way of financing than issuing shares:'" interest on loans
can be written off as an expense, whereas dividends are paid out
of after-tax profits, the net result at the present approximately 48%
tax rate on corporate profits being that company costs for a 107 loan
would be almost the same as paying 57 in dividends on the same
amount of equity investment, except that in the former case 107
would be more than adequate, whereas in the latter 5% in dividends
may not attract many investors.
Having found out all this, he may change his mind a little bit
and admit that there is some merit in the Japanese system, although
he is hardly likely to go so far as to admit that the 11:1 debt/
equity ratio of Idemitsu in 1966 is a healthy sign. Further, if he
studies the behavior of other foreign enterprises in the Japanese mar-
12 Official Trade Bulletin, No. 1479, 1480, March 10, 1969, at 10.
13 BuSINESS STRATEGIES FOR JAPAN, supra note 4, at 63.
[Vol. 6: 178
INTRODUCTION TO JOINT VENTURING
ket and compares their financial behavior with that of Japanese en-
terprises, he will find that, while there are notable differences in
capital composition, foreign companies financial behavior in Japan
is much closer to that of Japanese companies than it is to that of their
parents in the West, and few, if any of them, go bankrupt.14 Of
course, everyone, except the government, knows that there is one
big difference: loans by Japanese or foreign banks to foreign affili-
ated companies in Japan are usually guaranteed by the foreign par-
ent with a branch of the lending bank overseas. This situation helps
to keep foreign affiliated companies in Japan independent from the
bank control and guidance that is a daily occurrence with their Jap-
anese counterparts. Perhaps the financial situation of the JV won't
be so bad after all, especially if viewed from the alternative methods
of financing - increasing capital or lending directly from the for-
eign parent - either of which would subject the company to con-
siderable government surveillance insofar as government validation
would be required for each capital increase or loan, a procedure
not likely to prove enticing to the foreign partner.
Yes, it is necessary to own your company rather than have it
controlled by banks or other financial institutions, but why not own
it using a little bit of Japanese know-how, backed by foreign capi-
tal from abroad.
Living with the Distribution System
Ripley's "Believe It or Not" section in The Japan Times (Oc-
tober 9, 1971) says:
The Memorial in Liege, Belgium, to Vincent de Beuron, who de-
fended the city against an enemy siege in 1468, is a steep stairway
of 407 steps symbolizing his efforts to lift the spirits of the people.
I think such a memorial would be fitting for any foreigner who
could master the Japanese distribution system, except that the stair-
way in this case should not be an evenstep, straight stairway but one
with large steps (symbolizing the trading houses), medium-spaced
steps (symbolizing the medium-sized wholesales), shorter than med-
ium-sized steps (symbolizing the smaller wholesalers), very many
short jagged steps interspersed here and there (symbolizing the
ringisho system of decision making in operation within each insti-
tution at each level), and, finally, a number of twists and turns to
accommodate obligations of girl and trying to avoid offending people.
A few obstacle courses should most likely be added to indicate the
14 FOREIGN ENTERPRISES, supra note 2, at 34.
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traffic logjams that build up on the Japanese highways through
which most goods must pass at one stage or another on their way to
the ultimate consumer. The only question would be about the
sufficiency of 407 steps to describe the system in detail.
It would be a considerable understatement of the facts to say
that the Japanese distribution system is rather complex. The num-
bers alone are quite staggering, with 280,000 wholesalers and
1,390,000 retailers, a fact which puts the complexity of the system
in focus.15 The basic system is as follows: the Japanese manufac-
turer disposes of his goods through a principal wholesaler, usually
referred to as the dai-ichi tonya. Depending on the produict, the
principal wholesaler either sells directly to very large consumers, as
in the case of heavy industrial goods, or he works through sec-
ondary, tertiary, and possibly many other levels of wholesalers be-
fore the goods finally reach the retail outlets and eventually the con-
sumer. Because many of the intermediary wholesalers Will be
rather small and, in typical Japanese fashion, poorly financed, the
dai-ichi tonya will be responsible for financing on a reasonably long-
term basis and, hence, will need large amounts of capital to keep the
system above water. The wholesalers, in turn, are often responsible
for financing retail operations, advertising, in-house displays, etc.
Of course, the operation never runs so smoothly because down
the line of the distribution channel many other relationships of blood
or girl enter in which sometimes prevent the choosing of the most
efficient channel and, on occasion, even compel the acceptance of a
very inefficient channel of distribution. Such is the operation of
the fairly standard distribution system.
However, for the manufacturer that is not the end. Unless the
primary wholesaler with whom he is associated is of abnormal size,
it is unlikely that he will have access to the whole of the Japanese
market; those parts not taken care of will have to be attended to by
the manufacturer's own sales outlet, through which he will deal
with various regional or local wholesale outlets. In addition, as in
the case of one bean paste company, he will have his obligations of
girl and blood to fulfill which will require him to take under his
wing many relatives of the president, school friends, and former busi-
ness associates, most of whom are a liability rather than an asset.
Furthermore, he will have to put his own salesmen into the field to
ensure that his product gets the attention and PR that it should
get and which the wholesaler system will not normally provide. As
15 R. BALLON, JAPAN'S MARKET AND FOREIGN BuSINEss 222 (1971).
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a method of physical distribution, the wholesaler system, especially
that of the larger wholesalers, is extremely efficient, but as a method
of selling it is not to be relied upon, at least for goods that need a
lot of consumer-directed sales promotion.
When the foreign partner to the JV first hears of the intricate
distribution network of the Japanese parent, which would be the
logical outlet for the products of the JV, he will probably be flab-
bergasted. In the back of his mind he will most likely be thinking
of the streamlined system of the West, in particular of the United
States, where most wholesalers are located in the large cities and
communications with retail outlets, which are less than half as num-
erous in relation to the population as are those of Japan, are excel-
lent. He will also be very conscious of cost minimization and the
critical path scheduling (CPS) techniques he learned at school and
put into practice later. Perhaps in relation to his thinking on CPS
he should also cast a thought on the other related word, GIGO
(which means "if you put garbage in, you get garbage out"), be-
cause in relation to the Japanese scene that is probably what he may
want to do.
There are few similarities between the Western system of dis-
tribution and that of Japan. The Western system is simply to get
goods from the manufacturer to the consumer by the shortest, most
efficient, and cheapest route and to get plenty of them there at the
highest level of profit possible. If anyone doesn't perform up to
certain high standards, he is dropped, and he understands even
though he does not like it. The human element seldom enters the
picture. There are good discounts for everyone involved and little
sympathy for the loser. In Japan it is almost entirely the opposite.
You go through a particular channel because of past relationships;
you subsidize, advise, and in every way possible maintain good rela-
tions with each link in the chain, and, unless there are exceptional
reasons, you rarely drop a link in that chain. The human element
is everything, and profits are very thin, or, as is said in Japanese,
"as thin as paper."
However, things in the distribution system of Japan are chang-
ing. It is no longer monopolized by a few large trading houses, as
it was in the past. Big manufacturers have tried and succeeded in
setting up their own distribution systems, partly along traditional
lines, partly with the Western concept in view. Supermarkets, chain
stores, and department stores have boomed and left their imprint on
the distribution system by cutting out many of the middle men.
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Even some foreign companies, such as Coca-Cola, have succeeded
in establishing an independent distribution system. Still, with all
this change, the traditional system is deeply entrenched and almost
defies all efforts of modernization. The traditional system, and
probably it alone, is the key to reaching most of the 1,390,000 re-
tailers, more than 907o of which have four or less employees.16
The foreigner would be well advised to look at both sides of
the distribution system before pushing his Japanese partner too hard.
He may think the JV can become another Coca-Cola, but he should
also remember Heinz and Safeway, which tried and failed dis-
mally.'" He can, however, do much to help his Japanese partner
modernize and update his distribution system if he takes the correct
approach and uses Japanese examples of modernization rather than
United States examples. Starting the JV is a wonderful opportun-
ity for doing this because later on it may prove too difficult. The
foreign party should use the traditional system as the basic pattern,
but do like many Japanese companies have done: knock off some of
the unproductive elements, or should I say don't include them, intro-
duce a more positive approach to consumer orientation, and, above
all, consult and get the understanding of all concerned about what
you have in mind so as to keep the human element alive and not
to be branded as a "monopolistic distributor." If he does this
the foreigner can be reasonably sure that his efforts and those
of the JV in getting its products to the consumer will be successful.
Don't underestimate the distribution system and treat it tenderly.
VI. "FREE" MARKET
At last the JV has finally managed to iron out all its problems
and there is harmony in the group. The foreigner has now become
an expert on Japan and gotten absolute concurrence from his Japa-
nese partner on mutually agreeable and profitable methods of oper-
ating, staffing, etc. The products of the JV will go forth to the
Japanese market and also to the outside world in exports, a point
which is most pleasing to the Japanese government. The JV will
be a booming success within a few years. For the foreigner's sake
I hope it is a success, but not too much of a success in the sense of
capturing too large a share of the local market too soon. If it does
there may be problems.
While foreign capital affiliated enterprises account for 1.5% of
16 ADAMS & KOBAYASHI, supra note 9, at 190.
17Id. at 194-95.
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total sales in the Japanese market,18 the number of them that hit
the headlines of the local newspapers would seem to be grossly out
of proportion to their sales or their numbers. Furthermore, it is
seldom the unsuccessful ones that we hear about, but rather the
successful ones who engage in all sorts of "unfair" business prac-
tices. Examples of these are Coca-Cola with its exploding bottles
and, to add insult to injury, its flaunting of Japanese government
regulations in doing business without a license in a product "said
to contain acids harmful to humans"; Revlon with its inflammable
hair spray; Maxwell House with its mercury-contaminated coffee;
Pepsi Cola with its unfair premium advertising on bottle caps; and
numerous others.
In addition, the joint venture that is "too" successful, or poten-
tially so, may come in for an excessive amount of attention from
MITI. It may even be asked to write a nensho promising to limit
its market share; of course, this never hits the headlines. It may
be blackballed by trade associations as an "imperialistic" enterprise
or numerous other things may happen, all of which are just ways
of telling the JV or the foreign enterprise to go slow and not to be
so greedy.
It's a free market, but foreign affiliated enterprises mustn't up-
set the equilibrium of the Japanese, market by engaging in excessive
competition (kato kyoso). There is a certain kind of logic in this
reasoning, and it should be regarded as very empirical logic by the
would-be foreign partner to a JV. Recognize the reality, act accord-
ingly, and all will be well! Don't stand out too much because
there is a saying in Japan, "deru kugi ga utareru," meaning "the
nail that stands out shall be striken." Don't be that nail!
VII. DON'T BE A SHORT-TIMER
Most Japanese don't like to work for a foreign company, and
many of them don't like to work for a foreign affiliated enterprise.
The principal reason they give for this is that it lacks security, which,
to them, is often synonymous with permanency. While a lot of this
thinking is based on a certain innate prejudice of the Japanese
toward foreigners and things foreign, ii -annot be said to be en-
tirely without foundation. A number of foreign companies have,
unfortunately, not been models of permanency: they enter the Jap-
anese market when the going is good, and when things begin to
slacken they pull out and leave their Japanese employees and those
associated with them the poorer for having known them. While the
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number of such enterprises is few, they make the environment much
less friendly for others who may wish to come after them or who
may be there already, as people willing and highly paid to publicize
these shortcomings of foreign enterprises are not few.
Foreigners wishing to enter into a JV relationship should think
in terms of permanency. They should establish their JV with their
Japanese partners in such a way that it will have all the trimmings
or permanency. Many of the ideas stated in this article will be rele-
vant in this respect. The JV should not become a "division" of
the Japanese parent, but should be an independent entity with its
own land and buildings, the first sign of permanency. Its employ-
ees should not be shukko system employees, but, as soon as possible,
should be its own hired employees who are given all the usual
fringe benefits that employees of ordinary Japanese companies enjoy.
These should include, where feasible, housing or dormitory facil-
ities and retirement benefits, as well as the usual company trips and
family-oriented programs. If possible, the JV should try to become
a member of its industry's trade association, try to become involved
in local projects, and, in particular, make every effort to gain a
good image, because with many Japanese enterprises image is often
more important than the goods they produce.
Should the JV fail to establish an image of permanency it will
be regarded as a short-timer, and Japan has no place for short-
timers. Its employees' morale will drop and its new recruits, if it
gets any, will be either third or fourth-class beginners, or dropouts
from other Japanese or foreign companies. Everything about the
JV will foretell its early demise, which will probably not be long
in coming.
If, on the other hand, the JV becomes a permanent entity in
the Japanese industrial society, it will enjoy the fruits of diligent,
hardworking, and devoted employees, who will not be lacking when
needed. It will soon be able to take it's place with pride among
successful Japanese enterprises striving to lead the world in their
field, and it will contribute much, not only in monetary terms, but
also in stature, to its parent organizations, both in Japan and abroad,
which will mean more business and more profit, and that is what
JV's are all about.
The road to a successful JV is not an easy one. It takes long and
patient planning and a lot of hard work and uphill fighting, but, if it
is successful, it will have succeeded not only in bringing two companies
closer together, but in a small way two peoples with all their respective
prejudices and shortcomings; a noble achievement indeed!
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